Choosing the right cipher / alias crypto wars part twelve

Choosing the right cipher for your server.

The wanted options:

  • Only 256 bit
  • Only Mac AEAD[1]  since in TLS 1.3 that is only allowed.
  • Kx (Key exchange) and Au (Authentication) PSK (pre-shared key) is not an option for a webserver
  • DSS cipher is for key auth
  • Kx=DH without an EC ( Elliptic curves) is not secure enough
  • Kx=RSA is weak
  • AESCCM is also a Cipher Block Chaining (CBC)
  • Aria is for Secure Real-Time Transport Protocol (SRTP)
  • DHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 and DHE-RSA-CHACHA20-POLY1305 have no EC (elliptic curves)
/opt/openssl/bin/openssl ciphers -v ALL:COMPLEMENTOFALL | grep -v "(128)" | grep "Mac=AEAD" | grep -v "Kx=PSK" | \
grep -v "Au=PSK" | grep -v "Kx=RSAPSK" | grep -v "Au=DSS" | grep -v "Kx=RSA" | grep -v "Enc=AESCCM" | \
grep -v "Enc=ARIAGCM" | grep -v "Au=None" | grep -v "Kx=DH"

The Output

TLS 1.3
TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 TLSv1.3 Kx=any Au=any Enc=AESGCM(256) Mac=AEAD
TLS_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256 TLSv1.3 Kx=any Au=any Enc=CHACHA20/POLY1305(256) Mac=AEAD

TLS 1.2
ECDHE-ECDSA-CHACHA20-POLY1305 TLSv1.2 Kx=ECDH Au=ECDSA Enc=CHACHA20/POLY1305(256) Mac=AEAD
ECDHE-ECDSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 TLSv1.2 Kx=ECDH Au=ECDSA Enc=AESGCM(256) Mac=AEAD
ECDHE-RSA-CHACHA20-POLY1305 TLSv1.2 Kx=ECDH Au=RSA Enc=CHACHA20/POLY1305(256) Mac=AEAD
ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 TLSv1.2 Kx=ECDH Au=RSA Enc=AESGCM(256) Mac=AEAD

At last POLY over AES for speed, and ECDSA over RSA also for speed.

SSLCipherSuite SSL ECDHE-ECDSA-CHACHA20-POLY1305:ECDHE-ECDSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384:ECDHE-RSA-CHACHA20-POLY1305:ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384
SSLCipherSuite TLSv1.3 TLS_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256:TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384

This was done with the current latest OpenSSL version 1.1.1l

Only for the completeness, GCM is Galois/Counter Mode[2]

 

[1] https://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/Authenticated_Encryption
[2] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Galois/Counter_Mode

Obsolete key exchange mechanisms alias crypto wars part eleven

Obsolete key exchange mechanisms alias crypto wars part eleven

Especially weak key exchange mechanisms indicated by the cipher suite include those designated as EXPORT or ANON;  cipher suites using these key exchange mechanisms should not be used. Even if the cipher suite used in a TLS session is acceptable, a key exchange mechanism may use weak keys that allow exploitation. TLS key exchange methods include RSA key transport and DH or ECDH key establishment. DH and ECDH include static as well as ephemeral mechanisms. NSA recommends RSA key transport and ephemeral DH (DHE) or ECDH (ECDHE) mechanisms, with RSA or DHE key exchange using at least 3072-bit keys and ECDHE key exchanges using the secp384r1 elliptic curve. For RSA key transport and DH/DHE key exchange,  keys less than 2048 bits should not be used,  and ECDH/ECDHE using custom curves should not be used. The use of custom public key parameters in key exchange messages is deprecated per RFC 8422 Section 5.1.1

The recommended configuration is the following

Header always set Strict-Transport-Security "max-age=15553000; preload"
SSLUseStapling On
SSLSessionCache shmcb:/opt/apache2/logs/ssl_gcache_data(512000)
SSLStaplingCache shmcb:/opt/apache2/logs/ssl_stapling_data(512000)
SSLOptions +StrictRequire +StdEnvVars -ExportCertData
SSLProtocol -all +TLSv1.2 +TLSv1.3
SSLCompression Off
SSLHonorCipherOrder On
SSLCipherSuite SSL ECDHE-ECDSA-CHACHA20-POLY1305:ECDHE-RSA-CHACHA20-POLY1305:ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384:DHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384
SSLCipherSuite TLSv1.3 TLS_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256:TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384

SSLOpenSSLConfCmd ECDHParameters secp521r1
SSLOpenSSLConfCmd Curves sect571r1:sect571k1:secp521r1:sect409k1:sect409r1:secp384r1

H2Direct On

SSLOpenSSLConfCmd SignatureAlgorithms rsa_pss_rsae_sha512:rsa_pss_rsae_sha256:ECDSA+SHA512:ECDSA+SHA256:RSA+SHA512:RSA+SHA256
SSLOpenSSLConfCmd ClientSignatureAlgorithms rsa_pss_rsae_sha512:rsa_pss_rsae_sha256:ECDSA+SHA512:ECDSA+SHA256:RSA+SHA512:RSA+SHA256

Fight CBC ciphers with 256 bit alias crypto wars part ten

Since a few weeks the ssllabs server tests marks three more ciphers as CBC ciphers. Block ciphers are not secure. And flagged orange in the test results.

The candidates are

ECDHE-RSA-AES256-SHA384
ECDHE-RSA-AES256-SHA
DHE-RSA-AES256-SHA

Removing them form the configuration also means removing the support for several older browsers.

The new recommended cipher suite is:

SSLCipherSuite SSL ECDHE-ECDSA-CHACHA20-POLY1305:ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384:DHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384
SSLCipherSuite TLSv1.3 TLS_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256:TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384

 

Thanks to Gregg for showing the other POLY 1305 ciphers that I didn’t know of until today. I saw you post at AL.
Update: I had to remove ECDHE-RSA-CHACHA20-POLY1305 and DHE-RSA-CHACHA20-POLY1305 since they are not HIPAA nor NIST compatible.

The TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 ciphers is mandatory for TLS 1.3, but I kindly ignore that since I want only 256 bit encryption. This is not madness, this is crypto wars.

The whole configuration

<If "%{SERVER_PORT} == '443'">
        <IfModule mod_headers.c>
                Header always set Strict-Transport-Security "max-age=15553000; preload"
        </IfModule>
</If>
SSLUseStapling On
SSLSessionCache shmcb:/opt/apache2/logs/ssl_gcache_data(512000)
SSLStaplingCache shmcb:/opt/apache2/logs/ssl_stapling_data(512000)
SSLOptions +StrictRequire +StdEnvVars -ExportCertData
SSLProtocol -all +TLSv1.2 +TLSv1.3
SSLCompression Off
SSLHonorCipherOrder On
SSLCipherSuite SSL ECDHE-ECDSA-CHACHA20-POLY1305:ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384:DHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384
SSLCipherSuite TLSv1.3 TLS_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256:TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384

SSLOpenSSLConfCmd ECDHParameters secp384r1
SSLOpenSSLConfCmd Curves sect571r1:sect571k1:secp521r1:sect409k1:sect409r1:secp384r1:sect283k1:sect283r1:secp256k1:prime256v1

H2Direct On

Finding the right ciphers with 256 bit alias crypto wars part nine

Finding a good cipher for your web server is not an easy task. openssl ciphers -v ALL:COMPLEMENTOFALL lists all the available ciphers on your system.
What we don’t want

  • SSLv3 that is no longer secure.
  • 128 bit encryption is too weak
  • no encrytion cipther ;)
  • DSS cipher for key auth
  • DHE-RSA-AES256-SHA is no longer secure
  • TLSv1 no longer secure
  • PSK ( pre shared key) cipher
  • CAMELLIA
  • CBC cipher because of the BEAST attack
  • RSA because of FREAK and SMACK and ROBOT
  • Au=None
  • AESCCM it is also a Cipher Block Chaining (CBC)

That gives us:

openssl ciphers -v ALL:COMPLEMENTOFALL | grep -v "SSLv3" | grep -v "(128)" | grep -v "Enc=None" | \
 grep -v "Au=DSS" | grep -v "DHE-RSA-AES256-SHA" | grep -v "TLSv1 " | grep -v "Au=PSK" | grep -v "Kx=RSAPSK" | \
 grep -v "CAMELLIA" | grep -v "CBC" | grep -v "Au=RSA" | grep -v "Au=None" | grep -v "Enc=AESCCM"

now choose your poison.

http/2.0 sslciphersuites with 256 bit alias crypto wars part eight TLSv1.3

Now with the release of Apache 2.4.37 it supports TLSv1.3 (with OpenSSL 1.1.1). Before is was possible to compile Apache against OpenSSL 1.1.1 but it had no effect compared to OpenSSL 1.1.0

There are some advantages using TLS 1.3. it comes with Zero Round Trip Time (0-RTT). Explained simply, with TLS 1.2, two round-trips had been needed to complete the TLS handshake. With TLSv1.3, it requires only one round-trip, which in turn cuts the encryption latency in half. It feels faster.

At the moment only Chrome and Firefox support TLS 1.3. But I think other browser will follow soon.

This requires Apache 2.4.37 or better and OpenSSL 1.1.1 or better. Note that there are now two different directives for SSLCipherSuite. Also new is that the names for the Ciphers for TLS 1.3 are  directly taken from the OpenSSL internal naming. This is different compared to the old way in apache. Only two ciphers that are allowed for TLSv1.3 support 256 bit encryption that is why I chose those.

Listen 443
<If "%{SERVER_PORT} == '443'">
<IfModule mod_headers.c>
Header always set Strict-Transport-Security "max-age=15553000; preload"
</IfModule>
</If>

ProtocolsHonorOrder On
Protocols h2c h2 http/1.1

TraceEnable Off

SSLUseStapling On
SSLSessionCache shmcb:/opt/apache2/logs/ssl_gcache_data(512000)
SSLStaplingCache shmcb:/opt/apache2/logs/ssl_stapling_data(512000)
SSLOptions +StrictRequire +StdEnvVars -ExportCertData
SSLProtocol -all +TLSv1.2 +TLSv1.3
SSLCompression Off
SSLHonorCipherOrder On
SSLCipherSuite SSL ECDHE-ECDSA-CHACHA20-POLY1305:ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384:ECDHE-RSA-AES256-SHA384:ECDHE-RSA-AES256-SHA:DHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384:DHE-RSA-AES256-SHA256:DHE-RSA-AES256-SHA
SSLCipherSuite TLSv1.3 TLS_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256:TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384

SSLOpenSSLConfCmd DHParameters "/opt/apache2/conf/dh4096.pem"
SSLOpenSSLConfCmd ECDHParameters secp384r1
SSLOpenSSLConfCmd Curves sect571r1:sect571k1:secp521r1:sect409k1:sect409r1:secp384r1:sect283k1:sect283r1:secp256k1:prime256v1

H2Direct On

Sadly not OS Distributions support the last OpenSSL version or that TLv1.3 version has been backported or it has been patched, but apache shows still an older version number.

http/2.0 sslciphersuites with 256 bit alias crypto wars part seven meeting Canada

Some weeks ago canada released a document for offical / public websites. No longer is TLS 1.0 nor TLS 1.1 allowed, but TLS 1.2 and TLS 1.3

Until this writing apache does not support TLS 1.3 yet, but it will come soon. This is because Apache does not work 100% with OpenSSL 1.1.1 yet. Soon it will do.

This brings an updated SSL config for apache webserver

 

<If "%{SERVER_PORT} == '443'">
<IfModule mod_headers.c>
Header always set Strict-Transport-Security "max-age=15553000; preload"
</IfModule>
</If>
SSLUseStapling On
SSLSessionCache shmcb:/opt/apache2/logs/ssl_gcache_data(512000)
SSLStaplingCache shmcb:/opt/apache2/logs/ssl_stapling_data(512000)
SSLOptions +StrictRequire +StdEnvVars -ExportCertData
SSLProtocol -all +TLSv1.2
SSLCompression Off
SSLHonorCipherOrder On
SSLCipherSuite ECDHE-ECDSA-CHACHA20-POLY1305:ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384:ECDHE-RSA-AES256-SHA384:ECDHE-RSA-AES256-SHA:DHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384:DHE-RSA-AES256-SHA256:DHE-RSA-AES256-SHA

SSLOpenSSLConfCmd ECDHParameters secp384r1
SSLOpenSSLConfCmd Curves sect571r1:sect571k1:secp521r1:sect409k1:sect409r1:secp384r1:sect283k1:sect283r1:secp256k1:prime256v1

H2Direct On

Some old clients including older Android versions are not longer supported, unless you install a newer browser like current Firefox.

http/2.0 sslciphersuites with 256 bit alias crypto wars part six meeting HIPPA

The chosen SSL Config was very good! But for I client I had to meet the specs from PCI DSS[1], HIPAA[2] and NIST[3].
The server already was PCI DSS ready. However since there are medical data it had to meet HIPAA too.

It turned out that HIPAA does not allow the nice CHACHA20-POLY1305 ciphers and I had to enable SSLStaplingCache that I turned of when I used StartSSL Certs cause of the timeout / outage from the response server from start ssl.

<If "%{SERVER_PORT} == '443'">
    <IfModule mod_headers.c>
        Header always set Strict-Transport-Security "max-age=15553000; preload"
    </IfModule>
</If>
SSLUseStapling On
SSLSessionCache shmcb:/opt/apache2/logs/ssl_gcache_data(512000)
SSLStaplingCache shmcb:/opt/apache2/logs/ssl_stapling_data(512000)
SSLOptions +StrictRequire +StdEnvVars -ExportCertData
SSLProtocol -all +TLSv1.1 +TLSv1.2
SSLCompression Off
SSLHonorCipherOrder On
SSLCipherSuite ECDHE-ECDSA-CHACHA20-POLY1305:ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384:ECDHE-RSA-AES256-SHA384:ECDHE-RSA-AES256-SHA:DHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384:DHE-RSA-AES256-SHA256:DHE-RSA-AES256-SHA

SSLOpenSSLConfCmd ECDHParameters secp384r1
SSLOpenSSLConfCmd Curves sect571r1:sect571k1:secp521r1:sect409k1:sect409r1:secp384r1:sect283k1:sect283r1:secp256k1:prime256v1

H2Direct On

I still get an A+ on ssllabs plus all green lights on htbridge ssl test.

[1] Payment Card Industry Data Security Standard
[2] Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act
[3] National Institute of Standards and Technology

http/2.0 sslciphersuites with 256 bit alias crypto wars part five A+ at SSL Test

At Qualys SLL Test labs tests I never had 100% for Key Exchange. Even adding a 4096 Diffie Hellman key did not do the trick.

Now I found adding

SSLOpenSSLConfCmd ECDHParameters secp384r1

to the config from Part 4 does the trick!

Now I can have all your bars on Qualys SSL Test at 100% without having an insane config no client can connect to.

http/2.0 sslciphersuites with 256 bit alias crypto wars part four

To get rid of 128 bit encryption I had to disable

ECDHE-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256

But then I got error messages from the popular browsers Server negotiated HTTP/2 with blacklisted suite. That is caused by DHE-RSA-AES256-SHA and ECDHE-RSA-AES256-SHA

With a lof of trial and error I came to the following

Listen 443
<If "%{SERVER_PORT} == '443'">
    <IfModule mod_headers.c>
        Header always set Strict-Transport-Security "max-age=15553000; preload"
    </IfModule>
</If>

ProtocolsHonorOrder On
Protocols h2c h2 http/1.1

SSLUseStapling off
SSLSessionCache shmcb:/opt/apache2/logs/ssl_gcache_data(512000)
SSLOptions +StrictRequire +StdEnvVars -ExportCertData
SSLProtocol -all +TLSv1 +TLSv1.1 +TLSv1.2
SSLCompression Off
SSLHonorCipherOrder On
SSLCipherSuite ECDHE-ECDSA-CHACHA20-POLY1305:ECDHE-RSA-CHACHA20-POLY1305:ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384:ECDHE-RSA-AES256-SHA384:DHE-RSA-CHACHA20-POLY1305:DHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384:DHE-RSA-AES256-SHA256 

However that has the negative effect that Android smaller than 7 and smaller than IE 11 can’t connect to the server. Also some older Firefox versions can’t connect. Depending on the application it might be worth to use such a config that doesn’t allow 128 bit encrypted connections.

http/2.0 sslciphersuites alias crypto wars part three

It has been a while since I wrote part two of the crypto wars. Luckily Peter Mosmans has backported ChaCha20 and Poly1305 ciphers of OpenSSL 1.1.0 to 1.0.2 on github so that at least Chrome browser can use 256 bit encryption over HTTP/2

However on the httpd dev mailing list there are a few people already talking about making changes to APR and httpd so that it will compile with OpenSSL 1.1.0

The config for that is:

SSLProtocol -all +TLSv1 +TLSv1.1 +TLSv1.2 
SSLCompression Off 
SSLHonorCipherOrder On 
SSLCipherSuite ECDHE-ECDSA-CHACHA20-POLY1305:ECDHE-RSA-CHACHA20-POLY1305:ECDHE-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256:ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384:ECDHE-RSA-AES256-SHA384:ECDHE-RSA-AES256-SHA:DHE-RSA-CHACHA20-POLY1305:DHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384:DHE-RSA-AES256-SHA256:DHE-RSA-AES256-SHA

Why 256 bit? 128 bit hasn’t been cracked yet. The answer is that the collection of data and the data will decrypted when the time has come with a new generation of computers.

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